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Agricultural Situation
Spotlight
Recently, a World Trade Organi-zation (WTO) panel ruled on adispute between Brazil and
the United States. The dispute, filed
by Brazil over cotton subsidies, ac-
cused the United States of lowering
world agricultural prices and distort-
ing agricultural trade flows through
various forms of agricultural sup-
port. Preliminary findings, as re-
ported by major news sources such
as CNN, the New York Times, and the
Economist magazine, indicate that
the WTO panel agreed with most of
Brazil’s case. The results of these
findings and the ongoing WTO agri-
cultural trade negotiations could
have a dramatic impact on the ways
agriculture can be supported by the
federal (and state) government. And
these possible changes in support
could affect production agriculture
in Iowa.
BRAZIL’S DISPUTE ON U.S.
COTTON SUPPORT
While the WTO dispute has several
components, the essence of Brazil’s
claim is that the United States violated
WTO commitments by providing sup-
port through various trade-distorting
programs in an amount that exceeded
allowable levels. The types of support
challenged include cotton-specific
programs, such as the Step 2 program,
and more general programs, such as
the marketing loan and direct pay-
ments programs. The reports suggest
that the WTO panel found fault with
both the cotton-specific and the gen-
eral programs.
The WTO panel’s report is not
widely available as of this writing but
is expected to be released to the gen-
eral public sometime this summer.
Therefore, comments in this article
are based on published reports from
news agencies covering the dispute. If
the WTO panel ruled that the general
programs had distorted world pro-
duction and trade in cotton, then
changes may be required in these pro-
grams to limit these distortions and
bring U.S. agricultural policy back in
line with our WTO agricultural com-
mitments. The general programs (di-
rect payments, countercyclical
payments, marketing loans, and crop
insurance) make up the vast majority
of U.S. agricultural support that flows
directly to producers. These pro-
grams are in effect for several crops,
not just for cotton. Thus, if the cotton
dispute ruling stands, changes in
these programs for all program crops
may be warranted.
WTO trade disputes are like
court cases in that the parties may
appeal decisions handed down by
dispute panels. The United States
will most certainly appeal this ruling
and attempt to overturn the deci-
sion. However, if the decision stands,
then policymakers will need to ad-
just U.S. support programs to comply
with the WTO or face penalties for
not doing so. Exactly what adjust-
ments would have to be made de-
pends on the exact nature of the
findings of the WTO panel. A reason-
able guess, however, would be re-
moval of any production and trade
incentives from these programs, and
this would likely be accompanied by
smaller payments.
The cotton dispute arose from
the large flow of funds going to U.S.
agriculture in the late 1990s and early
2000s. Direct payments, called AMTA
(Agricultural Market Transition Assis-
tance) or “Freedom to Farm” pay-
ments, were paid out on an annual
basis. Congress provided Market Loss
Assistance payments to offset low
commodity prices. Marketing loan
benefits, through loan deficiency pay-
ments, increased dramatically over
the period. Crop insurance premium
TABLE 1.  GOVERNMENT SUPPORT (BILLION $)
1999 2000 2001 2002
Corn Direct Payments 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.8
Countercyclical Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Market Loss Assistance
    Payments 2.5 2.5 2.2 0.0
Marketing Loan Benefits 2.4 2.6 1.2 0.0
Crop Insurance Benefits 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.9
Soybeans Direct Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Countercyclical Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Oilseed Payments 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Marketing Loan Benefits 2.3 2.6 3.4 0.0
Crop Insurance Benefits 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3
Upland Direct Payments 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
  Cotton Countercyclical Payments 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3
Market Loss Assistance
    Payments 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.0
Marketing Loan Benefits 1.5 0.5 2.5 0.8
Step 2 Benefits 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
Crop Insurance Benefits 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.3
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subsidies were increased to induce
participation. Between August 1999
and July 2003, roughly $12.5 billion
in support was provided to the U.S.
cotton industry. That works out to
just over $3 billion in annual sup-
port. From 1999 to 2003, the annual
total value of U.S. cotton production
ranged from $2.8 to $5.3 billion. Table
1 shows the types and amounts of
support going to cotton, corn, and
soybeans for the 1999-2002 crop
years. Figure 1 shows the ratios of
the sum of this government support
versus the value of production. As
can be seen in Figure 1, the level of
agricultural support was sizable in
comparison to the value of produc-
tion. This information, in combina-
tion with the market share of U.S.
cotton exports in the world market,
led Brazil to argue that these pay-
ments provided an additional incen-
tive to produce (over and above the
incentive from market prices alone)
and that the resulting increase in
production drove down world prices
and blocked those cotton producers
who farmed without subsidization
from trading opportunities.
CORN AND SOYBEAN
PROGRAMS NEXT?
The WTO decision relates to Iowa ag-
riculture because Iowa’s major
crops—corn and soybeans—have
many of the same programs providing
support. Also, the United States is a
major exporter in these crops, as it is
in cotton. So, parallel arguments
could be made about the effects of
government support on the produc-
tion and trade of corn and soybeans.
While the scale of government sup-
port for corn and soybeans is smaller
(as measured by the ratio of support
to production value), the overall
amount of expenditures is larger for
both corn and soybeans. In Iowa
alone, direct payments for corn and
soybeans amount to over $500 mil-
lion annually. Countercyclical pay-
ments could range from $0 to over
$700 million annually. Most of Iowa’s
corn and soybean production is cov-
ered by crop insurance and/or is en-
FIGURE 1.  RATIO OF GOVERNMENT SUPPORT VERSUS VALUE OF PRODUCTION
TABLE 2. WORLD PRICE AND U.S. PRODUCTION IMPACTS OF AGRICULTURAL
LIBERALIZATION
World Price U.S. Production
Change Change
Crop (percent) (percent)
Cotton +18 –11
Corn +5 +4
Soybeans +4 –3
rolled in the marketing loan program.
Thus, any changes in these programs
could have significant effects on the
amount of agricultural support flow-
ing to Iowa. Reports also suggest that
export credit guarantee programs for
several commodities, including cot-
ton, corn, and soybeans, were investi-
gated by the WTO dispute panel and
found to be noncompliant. If the rul-
ing holds, these guarantee programs
would need to be eliminated.
Whether similar disputes against
corn and/or soybeans would be suc-
cessful would depend on the WTO dis-
pute panel and the evidence brought
forward by the parties in the dispute.
But a study conducted by the Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Insti-
tute in 2002 indicates that claims
against U.S. corn and soybean pro-
grams would be more difficult to
prove. The study looked at the produc-
tion, price, and trade effects of the full
liberalization of agriculture, that is,
the removal of all agricultural trade
barriers and support programs. If we
examine the results for 2004 in com-
parison with the FAPRI baseline used
in the analysis, world prices would be
higher for all three crops under full
agricultural liberalization. Cotton
prices would be 18 percent above the
level they would be if no liberalization
occurred. Corn and soybean prices
would rise by 5 and 4 percent, respec-
tively. In two of the three commodi-
ties, U.S. production would fall. The
analysis finds that corn production
would increase with liberalization.
The impact on cotton is again at least
twice what it is on corn and soybeans.
Part of Brazil’s case on cotton
was that the subsidies drove U.S.
production up and world prices
down. The numbers in Table 2 attest
to how such an argument could be
made. World (not just U.S.) interfer-
ence in these agricultural markets
has significant effects. Cases against
corn and soybeans would be
tougher to argue, as the estimated
impacts are one-third to one-half as
large as they are for cotton. ◆
